Such terms are called 'simple' ( suppositio simplex). (3) A term can be the actual concept in the mind (man as that which is common to all individual men the species man). Words functioning in this way are called 'personal' ( suppositio personalis). (2) A term can signify a particular individual, whether outside or within the mind (Socrates, this man, for example). This is the word itself considered as a sound the sound made when we utter 'man'. (1) A term can be said to be 'material' ( suppositio materialis). And he adopted the classification which had been current in the thirteenth century.

Ockham says they then have a ' suppositio': they can 'stand for' things in a variety of ways. The referring characteristic of terms is brought into play when the terms are used in propositions. In other words, terms of second intention stand for terms of first intention. But terms of second intention refer to signs of other signs in the language (for example the word 'dog') or to natural signs (concepts).

Terms of first intention refer to things which are not signs of a language, for example, dog, tree. Ockham adopted also the distinction between 'first intention' and 'second intention'. This common feature is called a natural sign and is the concept or meaning ( terminus conceptus) of the conventional sign. But these different signs express the same state of mind ( intentio) and thus have something in common. Categorematic terms or words, whether spoken or written, are called conventional signs in so far as it is a linguistic convention that a given thing is referred to by a particular name ( the species 'man' in English, ' homo' in Latin, for example). Thus, in 'All men are mortal' 'men' and 'mortal (thing)' are categorematic, while 'all' is syncategorematic. These are of two kinds: (1) categorematic terms, which have meaning because of their reference to real things (2) syncategorematic terms, which have only a logical function to link categorematic terms. Ockham contributed greatly to the development of the 'logic of terms' which had been introduced in the twelfth century and developed in the thirteeenth. Because of the interruption of his career he never attained professorial rank, and he therefore became known as Venerabilis Inceptor (' inceptor' being the term used to describe those awaiting the award of their teaching licence). Later, in Munich, where he was supported by the Emperor, he was again embroiled in controversy, this time concerning the issue of the relation of Church power to the state. He was accused of heresy (his writings were condemned in 1326 and he was excommunicated) and he came into conflict with the Holy See at Avignon (1324-8) over the issue of evangelical poverty. He entered the Franciscan order before studying theology at Oxford, c. Kilcullen J et al (eds) British Academy.William (of) Ockham was born in the village of that name in Surrey, England. William of Ockham Dialogus: Latin text and English translation. William of Ockham (1940) Opera Politica, Sikes JG et al (eds) Manchester University Press, Manchester Tierney B (1997) The idea of natural rights. Oakley F (1961) Medieval theories of natural law: William of Ockham and the significance of the voluntarist tradition. In: Spade PV (ed) The Cambridge companion to Ockham. McGrade AS (1999) Natural law and moral omnipotence. In: Tierney B, Linehan P (eds) Authority and Power. McGrade AS (1980) Ockham and the birth of individual rights. McGrade AS (1974) The political though of William of Ockham.

Philosopher william of ockham